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The Illegality of the U.S. Policy of Preemptive
Self-Defense Under International Law
Chris Bordelon*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks in the
United States, domestic and foreign political actors who might
otherwise have balked if the world’s lone superpower claimed a
broad right to use force abroad instead offered the U.S. a strong
showing of goodwill and support.1 Perhaps interpreting this
solidarity as willingness to support American uses of force abroad
regardless of their permissibility under international law, the
Bush administration articulated a provocative interpretation of
the right of self-defense recognized in the United Nations
Charter. In a formal policy statement, the administration
claimed that this right, which is an exception to the general
prohibition of the use of force in international relations, justified
the use of preemptive force against “enemies” of the United
States.2
The Bush administration’s assertion of a right of preemptive
self-defense, along with its reliance on this purported right to
justify its use of force against Iraq, has drawn considerable
criticism on international law grounds.3 It is debatable whether
* Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. J.D., Pennsylvania State University, Dickinson School of
Law. Member, Pennsylvania and New Jersey bars. Assistant Counsel, Office of the
General Counsel, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. In expressing the opinions set forth
herein, the author speaks only for himself.
1 See George K. Walker, The Lawfulness of Operation Enduring Freedom’s SelfDefense Responses, 37 VAL. U. L. REV. 489, 494-95, 498-505 (2002-2003) (describing
Congressional and foreign reactions to September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and global
support against terrorism); JOHN F. MURPHY, THE UNITED STATES AND THE RULE OF LAW
IN INTERATIONAL AFFAIRS 167 (2004) [hereinafter J. MURPHY] (“The international reaction
to the attacks was swift and almost universally one of outrage and support for the United
States.”).
2 National Security Council, The National Security Strategy of the United States of
America, at 15 (September 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html
[hereinafter NSS].
3 See, e.g., Major Joshua E. Kastenberg, The Use of Conventional International Law
in Combating Terrorism: A Maginot Line for Modern Civilization Employing the
Principles of Anticipatory Self-Defense & Preemption, 55 A.F. L. REV. 87, 88 (2004) (“[A]
pressing question that has emerged on the world stage is whether and anticipatory self-
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anticipatory self-defense is permissible under international law.
However, the Bush administration’s preemption strategy calls for
the use of force beyond the scope of the right of self-defense, even
if the right is broadly construed.
The Bush administration released its formal policy
statement, “The National Security Strategy of the United States
This document
of America” (“NSS”), in September 2002.4
outlines various considerations that are said to guide the
administration’s foreign policy decisions.5 Of particular interest
is the document’s treatment of two categories of “enemies:”
“terrorists” and “rogue states.” The NSS contains no specific
definition of the term “terrorists.” However, the term includes
states that “knowingly harbor or . . . aid” terrorists.6 The NSS
defines “rogue states” as those states with characteristics that
match certain enumerated criteria and explicitly includes Iraq
and North Korea in this category.7 The document argues that
the emergence of these “new deadly challenges” has effected a
“profound transformation” in the “security environment,”8 and
has brought about a “new world” in which “the only path to peace
and security is the path of action.”9 In the context of the NSS,
the noun “action,” the verb “act,” and various derivations of these
words were used euphemistically to refer to the use of military
force by the U.S. against its “enemies.”10
The “action” contemplated against terrorists and rogue state
is not limited to deterrence of and response to the use or threat of
force by these groups, but includes action “against such emerging
threats before they are fully formed.”11 The U.S. will “not
hesitate to act alone” to prevent terrorists and rogue states from
attacking or threatening to attack, and will “exercise [its] right of
self-defense,” as the administration understands it, “by acting
preemptively.”12 The U.S. will “no longer solely rely on a reactive
posture as [it did] in the past,” nor will it “let . . . enemies strike
first,” or “remain idle while dangers gather.”13 Thus, under the
NSS, military force is to be used preemptively to “forestall or
defense and preemption are legitimate international law concepts.”).
4 NSS, supra note 2.
5 NSS, supra note 2.
6 NSS, supra note 2, at 5.
7 NSS, supra note 2, at 13-14.
8 NSS, supra note 2, at 13.
9 George W. Bush, Introduction to The National Security Strategy of the United
States of America, para. 5 (September 2002), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html [hereinafter Bush].
10 See NSS, supra note 2, at 15.
11 Bush, supra note 9, at para. 5.
12 NSS, supra note 2, at 6.
13 NSS, supra note 2, at 15.
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prevent . . . hostile acts by our adversaries.”14
While the
administration suggested at least one other justification for using
force against Iraq,15 it relied in part on its asserted right to
preemptive self-defense.16 The commencement of U.S. efforts to
put its theory of preemptive self-defense into practice warrants
an examination of whether self-defense is a valid justification for
using force in these circumstances.
The authors of the NSS believe that the preemptive use of
force is compatible with international law.17 The NSS states
that, “[f]or centuries, international law [has] recognized that
nations need not suffer an attack” before using force in selfdefense “against forces that present an imminent danger of
attack.”18 Preemption, the document asserts, has been regarded
as legitimate under international law when undertaken with
respect to an “imminent threat—most often a visible
mobilization” of military forces.19 Without further explanation of
what “imminent threat” means, the NSS asserts that “[w]e must
adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and
objectives of today’s adversaries.”20 “The greater the threat”
posed by these adversaries, the “more compelling the case for
taking anticipatory action . . . even if uncertainty remains as to
NSS, supra note 2, at 15.
The U.S. also justified its use of force against Iraq by citing several Security
Council resolutions authorizing force. See CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
USE OF FORCE 192-93 (2000) [hereinafter GRAY, USE OF FORCE] (describing the lack of
acceptance by other states of earlier U.S. claims that authorization to use force against
Iraq could be implied from past Council Resolutions); see also Amy E. Eckert & Manooher
Mofidi, Doctrine or Doctrinaire—The First Strike Doctrine and Preemptive Self-Defense
Under International Law, 12 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 117, 125-27 (2004) (noting the
failed attempt by the U.S. to obtain a Council resolution explicitly authorizing the use of
force in 2003 and describing U.S. efforts to obtain such a resolution); Ian Johnstone, USUN Relations After Iraq: The End of the World (Order) as We Know It?, 15 EUR. J. INT’L.
L. 813, 831 (2004) (briefly summarizing the arguments for and against the purported
Council authorization).
16 Eckert & Mofidi, supra note 15, at 123, 128; Lucy Martinez, September 11th, Iraq
and the Doctrine of Anticipatory Self-Defense, 72 UMKC L. REV. 123, 123 (2003-2004); see
also World Press Review Online, The United Nations, International Law, and the War in
Iraq, http://www.worldpress.org/specials/iraq (describing speeches by President Bush and
Secretary of State Colin Powell that suggested self-defense as a justification for the use of
force against Iraq) (last visited Nov. 12, 2005).
17 See NSS, supra note 2, at 15; John B. Bellinger III, Authority for the Use of Force
by the United States Against Iraq Under International Law (Apr. 10, 2003), at
http://www.cfr.org/publication.php?id=5862 (statements by the United Nations Secretary
General, phrased similarly to language in the NSS, to the effect that the proliferation of
highly destructive weapons justify the conclusion that “states cannot be required to wait
for an attack before they can lawfully use force to defend themselves”); see also J.
MURPHY, supra note 1, at 176 (noting that the NSS asserts a right of preemptive selfdefense, and adding that “it is by no means clear . . . that the [2002] attack against Iraq
can be justified as an act of self-defense).
18 NSS, supra note 2, at 15.
19 NSS, supra note 2, at 15.
20 NSS, supra note 2, at 15.
14
15
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the time and place of the enemy’s attack.”21
The NSS’s brief mention of the legality of the new U.S.
strategy provides an incomplete analysis of the relevant norms.
The NSS treats the permissible temporal scope of self-defense as
a matter of settled law. It thus ignores an ongoing scholarly and
international debate concerning when force may first be used.22
The document also fails to fully consider the application of two
customary international law principles, necessity and
proportionality, to uses of force called for by the preemption
strategy.23 Moreover, the NSS does not indicate the source of the
authority of the U.S. to unilaterally “adapt the concept of
imminent threat” to suit its present needs.24 Analysis of these
gaps in the NSS’s consideration of relevant international law
suggests that the administration’s confidence in the legality of
preemptive self-defense is misplaced.
II. THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND A STATE’S RIGHT OF
SELF-DEFENSE
Scholars regard the United Nations Charter (Charter) as the
“starting point” for analyzing the relevant norms restricting the
ability of states to threaten or use force.25 The Charter’s text
amply demonstrates its drafters’ fundamental concern with
limiting instances in which the use of force in international
relations would be considered legally permissible. The preamble
begins with an expression of the signatories’ determination “to
save succeeding generations from the scourge of war,” and
describes the “principles and . . . methods” contained in the
substantive portion of the Charter as being aimed at
“ensur[ing] . . . that armed force shall not be used, save in the
common interest.”26 The first of the “Purposes of the United
Nations” listed in Article 1 is “[t]o maintain international peace
and security.”27 The second Purpose commits the U.N. to
NSS, supra note 2, at 15.
See, e.g., GRAY, USE OF FORCE, supra note 15 at 86, 112; Leo Van den hole,
Anticipatory Self-Defence Under International Law, 19 AM. U. INT’L. L. REV. 69, 80-82
(2003-2004) (noting a division of opinion on when self-defense may first be used).
23 See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J 14, 98 (June
27) (discussing customary rules of international law).
24 See Hugh Thirlway, The Sources of International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
117, 125 (Malcolm Evans ed., Oxford University Press 2003) (explaining how customary
rules are formed).
25 Christine Gray, The Use of Force and the International Legal Order, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW 589, 590 (Malcolm Evans ed., Oxford University Press 2003)
[hereinafter Gray, in INTERNATIONAL LAW].
26 U.N. Charter pmbl.
27 Id. at art. 1, para 1.
21
22
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“take . . . appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.”28
A. Article 2(4)’s Prohibition on the Use of Force
Article 2(4) sets forth a principle that has been described as
“the heart” of the Charter,29 requiring member states to “refrain
in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of
the United Nations.”30 Other provisions of the Charter require
states that become parties to international disputes to “resolve
all their disputes by peaceful means.”31 However, Chapter VII of
the Charter contains two exceptions to the general prohibition of
the use of force.32 The first exception allows for the use of force
after the Security Council has “determine[d] the existence of any
threat, breach of the peace, or act of aggression”33 and “decide[d]”
that “measures shall be taken in accordance with Article . . .
42.”34 Article 42 empowers the Security Council to “take such
action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain
or restore international peace and security.”35 The second and
more frequently invoked exception is the reservation to states of
a right of self-defense contained within Article 51.36 The second
exception establishes that “[n]othing in the . . . Charter . . .
impair[s] the inherent right of individual or collective selfdefence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations.”37 When the “Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and

Id. at art. 1, para 2.
THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 117 (Bruno Simma ed., 2d
ed. 2002) [hereinafter Simma] (quoting Louis Henkin, The Reports of the Death of Article
2(4) are Greatly Exaggerated, 65 AM. J. INT’L L. 544 (1971)).
30 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
31 Id. at art. 2, para. 3; see also id. at art. 33, para. 1 (“The parties to any dispute, the
continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and
security, shall . . . seek a solution by . . . resort to . . . peaceful means . . . .”); Simma,
supra note 29, at 584 (describing the relationship between Article 2(3) and Article 33
provisions).
32 The title of Chapter VII of the Charter is “Action with Respect to Threats to the
Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression.” U.N. Charter.
33 Id. at art. 39.
34 Id.; see also id. at art. 41 (The Council may also decide to take measures not
involving the use of force.).
35 Id. at art. 42; see also id. at art. 43, para. 1 (noting that the Security Council may
call upon other states to contribute forces to a military action authorized pursuant to
Articles 39 and 42, and those states are obliged to make such forces available).
36 Id. at art. 51; see also Richard N. Gardner, Commentary on the Law of SelfDefense, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 52 (Lori Fisler Damrosch
& David J. Scheffer eds., 1991) [hereinafter Gardner, in LAW AND FORCE]; GRAY, USE OF
FORCE, supra note 15, at 84.
37 U.N. Charter art. 51.
28
29
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security,”38 however, the right to self-defense terminates.39
Moreover, a procedural limitation applies:
any measure
undertaken in self-defense must “be immediately reported to the
Security Council.”40
The characterization of the Charter’s text as the starting
point for analysis of the legality of the use of force is an apt one,
in part because the relevant text is fairly brief and the rules it
sets forth do not always provide clear answers when applied to
particular facts. Throughout the Charter’s history, states that
have used force have seized upon potential gaps in the Charter’s
prohibition of the use of force in order to justify their actions.41
For example, states have urged that particular uses of force fell
outside the parameters of the prohibition because the force was
not used “in the international relations between States.”42 States
have also argued that their particular use of force was not
“against the territorial integrity or political independence” of
another state, 43 or was not “inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations.”44 States that have used force have sometimes
claimed that these phrases give rise to implied exceptions to the
prohibition of the use of force, and therefore provide legal
justification for intervention in other states to achieve objectives
such as the fulfillment of humanitarian need,45 the attainment of
self-determination,46 the installation of democratic regimes,47 or
Id.
See id. (“Nothing . . . shall impair the inherent right of . . . self-defence if an armed
attack occurs . . . until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security.”) (emphasis added); see also J.N. SINGH, USE OF FORCE
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 31 (1984) (acknowledging that “[u]nder Article 51 . . . the
defending state has to stop its defence” when the Security Council has taken the specified
“measures”); Gideon A. Moor, Note, The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Article 51:
Inherent Rights and Unmet Responsibilities, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 870, 882 (1995) (same
interpretation). Some scholars assert that, for practical reasons, the language italicized
above is inoperative to terminate the right of self-defense if the “measures” taken by the
Security Council are only “economic” or “legal” in nature. See Thomas M. Franck,
Comment, Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defense, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 839, 841-42 (2001).
40 U.N. Charter art. 51.
41 See Jon E. Fink, From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: The Blurring of the
Mandate for the Use of Force in Maintaining International Peace and Security, 19 MD. J.
INT’L L. & TRADE 1, 7 (1995).
42 Simma, supra note 29, at 121-22.
43 Simma, supra note 29, at 123; see also GRAY, USE OF FORCE, supra note 15, at 4950 (China claims the right to use force against Taiwan on the basis of territorial
integrity.).
44 IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 268 (1963)
(rejecting such arguments).
45 James P. Terry, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention After Kosovo: Legal
Reality and Political Pragmatism, 2004 ARMY LAW. 36, 38 (2004) (arguing that
humanitarian intervention is permissible under the Charter as one of the Charter’s
purposes is protecting human rights; therefore, using force for humanitarian purposes is
permissible and not inconsistent with the purposes of the U.N.).
46 ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 322 (2001) (suggesting that the
prohibition on force applies only to states in this context and not to “peoples subjected to
38
39
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the preservation of socialism.48
Questions have also arisen regarding what actions constitute
“force” for the purposes of Article 2(4).49 Some argue that that
economic or physical actions not involving military action should
be treated as involving the use of force,50 as should indirect
support for military action by groups other than the armed forces
of the supporting state.51 Moreover, the Security Council’s
authorization of enforcement actions pursuant to Chapter VII is
accomplished by passing resolutions that may not clearly define
the exact scope of the authorization,52 providing states with
opportunities to justify uses of force that may or may not be
authorized depending on how one interprets the resolutions at
issue.53 Similarly, it has also been claimed that Security Council
resolutions which authorized force in the past have a continuous
and cumulative effect, with the result that the use of force may
be resumed at concerned states’ discretion without renewed
Security Council authorization.54
Notwithstanding the ambiguities and possible loopholes
found in Article 2(4), its prohibition on the use of force is widely
regarded as barring, as a general rule, the nonconsensual use of
force by one state against another.55 The preemptive measures
contemplated by the NSS are not consensual in nature.56
Moreover, the Bush administration has not sought to justify U.S.
action under the NSS by reference to the questionable exceptions
colonial domination or foreign occupation, as well as racial groups not represented in
government, [who] are forcibly denied the right to self-determination”).
47 Anthony S. Winer, The Reagan Doctrine, the 2003 Invasion of Iraq, and the Role of
a Sole Superpower, 22 LAW & INEQ. 169, 181 (2004) (explaining the “Reagan Doctrine” as
the use of military force to preserve democracy).
48 Id. at 181 (explaining that the “Brezhnev Doctrine” was the Soviet leader’s
philosophy that “the Soviet Union had the inherent authority to maintain communism in
any existing communist state when that system became threatened”).
49 Simma, supra note 29, at 117-21.
50 MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 687-88 (3d ed. 1991).
51 See Military and Paramilitary Activities, (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 14, paras.
191-92, 195 (June 27) (citing favorably resolutions of the United Nations General
Assembly and the General Assembly of the Organization of American States suggesting
that force can include actions of irregulars, and assuming that states can be responsible
for force and armed attacks undertaken by irregulars); Simma, supra note 29, at 119.
52 See Jules Lobel & Michael Ratner, Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous
Authorizations to Use Force, Cease-Fires and the Iraqi Inspection Regime, 93 AM. J. INT’L
L. 124, 126 (1999).
53 See Gray, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 25, at 610 (discussing Security
Council resolutions that purportedly justified NATO’s 1998 air campaign against
Yugoslavia).
54 See, e.g., GRAY, USE OF FORCE, supra note 15, at 192-93.
55 See, e.g., Simma, supra note 29, at 120-21; CASSESE, supra note 46, at 281; SHAW,
supra note 50, at 688.
56 See NSS, supra note 2, at 15-16 (implying that preemptive actions aim to strike at
adversaries and eliminate the threat they pose).
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to Article 2(4) just described; rather, the administration argues
that the unquestionably valid right of self-defense is expansive
enough to permit states invoking it to employ preemptive force.57
Although disagreement exists as to whether non-military action
can constitute force, it is widely held that non-consensual armed
action by one state against the territory of another— such as that
called for by the NSS— constitutes a use of force for purposes of
the Charter’s rules.58 The point at which a state’s support for
proxies fighting another state will be deemed a use of force by the
supporting state is not entirely clear.59 There can be no doubt,
however, that because the use of force called for by the U.S.
strategy consists of action by the American military, the U.S. is
responsible for using such force.60
B. The Right of Self-Defense Under Article 51
As the preceding discussion suggests, when the U.S.
undertakes military action under its NSS strategy, it is likely
making use of force within the meaning of Article 2(4).61 In the
future, no prior Security Council authorizations to use force are
likely to be available to provide justification when the NSS
strategy is applied. However, the argument will be advanced, as
it has been in the case of the Iraq war,62 that the force used by
the U.S. is a legitimate exercise of the right of self-defense
recognized in Article 51. The text of Article 51, like that of other
Charter provisions dealing with the use of force, has given rise to
important issues of interpretation. The meaning of the term
NSS, supra note 2, at 15.
See Simma, supra note 29, at 117-18 (The “correct and prevailing view” is that
armed force is prohibited; beyond that, arguments have been advanced that economic or
political pressure may constitute force within the meaning of Article 2(4).); see also
BROWNLIE, supra note 44, at 268.
59 See Simma, supra note 29, at 120-21 (noting ambiguities of state responsibility for
the actions of irregular forces that were addressed in Military and Paramilitary Activities,
(Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27), and pointing out that “not every act of
assistance” given by a state to irregulars “is to be qualified as a use of force”). It is
uncontroversial, however, that actions undertaken by irregular forces should at least
sometimes be treated as uses of force by states with which the irregulars are in some way
connected. Simma, supra note 29, at 119 n.40 (characterizing this proposition as
“virtually undisputed”); see also Military and Paramilitary Activities, (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986
I.C.J. 14, paras. 191-92, 195 (June 27) (indicating what force states can be responsible for
and when armed attacks undertaken by irregulars are considered force).
60 Simma, supra note 29, at 119 (viewing as uncontroversial the proposition that
force under Article 2(4) includes “the open incursion of regular military forces into the
territory of another State”); cf. Military and Paramilitary Activities, (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986
I.C.J. 14, para. 195 (June 27) (stating that an “armed attack” under Article 51
“includ[es] . . . action by regular armed forces across an international border”); Gray, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 25, at 602 (same).
61 See NSS, supra note 2, at 15-16.
62 See supra note 16 and accompanying text (noting that the U.S. has proffered selfdefense as one justification for the Iraq invasion).
57
58
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“armed attack” in Article 51, and the relationship of that term to
the “use of force” prohibited by Article 2(4), have been called into
question. In particular, controversy exists as to whether or not
the two terms are synonymous.63 The International Court of
Justice (ICJ) has suggested that the terms have different
meanings because some state actions properly characterized as
uses of force are not of sufficient “gravity” to qualify as armed
attacks.64 Thus, according to the ICJ, not every “use of force” is
sufficiently serious to be treated as an “armed attack” that would
permit a forcible response to be justified as self-defense.65 With
respect to the Iraq war, however, there has been no showing that
Iraq used or threatened any force at all in advance of the 2002
U.S. invasion, much less engaged in an armed attack.66
It may be argued that the September 11, 2001 attacks
constituted an armed attack which ultimately gave the U.S. a
right to exercise self-defense against Iraq. Prior to that date, it
was not clear whether a terrorist act could be treated as an
armed attack;67 however, the Security Council’s response implied
that the September 11 attacks gave rise to an affirmative right to
use force in self-defense.68 While the Security Council did not
declare Afghanistan responsible for the attacks, the U.S. justified
the war against Afghanistan as an act of self-defense.69 Most
states were receptive to the notion that Afghanistan was
sufficiently responsible for supporting the September 11th
attackers to permit responsibility for the attacks to be imputed to
Afghanistan.70 The attacks appeared to rise to the level of armed
attacks within the meaning of Article 51, so U.S. claims of a right
to use force in self-defense against Afghanistan were widely
63 Oscar Schachter, In Defense of International Rules on the Use of Force, 53 U. CHI.
L. REV. 113, 136 (1986) [hereinafter Schachter, In Defense of International Rules].
64 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 103-04 (June
27).
65 See Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of ‘Armed Attack’ in Article 51 of
the U.N. Charter, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 41, 44 (2002) [hereinafter S. Murphy].
66 J. MURPHY, supra note 1, at 176 (noting that “[t]here is no evidence that Iraq was
part of an armed attack against the United States”); see also Gray, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra note 25, at 605 (concluding that if Iraq were not shown to have been involved
in planning or undertaking armed attacks against the U.S., then use of force by the U.S.
against Iraq would be “stretching pre-emptive self-defence to an extreme”).
67 See Schachter, In Defense of International Rules, supra note 63, at 139-41
(describing this as a “controversial question”).
68 See Johnstone, supra note 15, at 828.
69 See Johnstone, supra note 15, at 828; Jonathan I. Charney, The Use of Force
against Terrorism and International Law, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 835, 835-36 (2001) (noting
that self-defense was asserted as the justification for the use of force by the U.S. against
Afghanistan, and suggesting that the justification may have been valid, but criticizing the
failure of the U.S. to provide the international community with adequate information or
to obtain the approval of the Security Council before invading Afghanistan).
70 See Johnstone, supra note 15, at 828; J. MURPHY, supra note 1, at 167.
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perceived as unobjectionable.71 While the U.S. made efforts to
connect Iraq to the September 11 attacks, the U.S. government
could not produce the evidence needed to impute responsibility
for those acts to Iraq.72 Thus, the distinction between the use of
force and more substantial armed attacks is inapposite,73 because
Iraq did not use force at all, much less use it in a manner
substantial enough to give rise to an armed attack.
Given that Iraq was apparently not responsible for any
armed attacks against the U.S., one might think that the U.S.
claim that its use of force against Iraq was undertaken in selfdefense necessarily fails. The text of Article 51, after all, seems
to indicate that the right of self-defense arises only when “an
armed attack occurs.”74 However, in this instance, the text
obscures an interpretive dispute that hinges directly on the U.S.
claim. States and scholars disagree as to the time at which the
right of self-defense becomes available for exercise.75
Determining the legitimacy of the U.S.’s claim of a right to use
preemptive force to defend itself depends upon the extent to
which self-defense may be exercised in advance of an armed
attack.
C. Permissive and Restrictive Interpretations of the Right of SelfDefense
Article 51 must be interpreted in order to determine if the
right of self-defense can permit the use of preemptive force. The
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which the U.S. has
signed but not ratified, provides a useful guide to the
interpretation of the treaty provisions such as Article 51.76 The
Vienna Convention requires that treaties “be interpreted in good
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to
[their] terms . . . in their context and in the light of [their] object
See Johnstone, supra note 15, at 828-29; J. MURPHY, supra note 1, at 167.
Mahmoud Hmoud, The Use of Force Against Iraq: Occupation and Security
Council Resolution 1483, 36 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 435, 443 (2004); Martinez, supra note 16,
at 190.
73 See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text (describing this distinction).
74 U.N. Charter art. 51.
75 See, e.g., GRAY, USE OF FORCE, supra note 15, at 86, 112 (noting division of opinion
on the interpretation of the Article 51 text); Van den hole, supra note 22, at 80-83 (also
noting division of opinion).
76 United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 22, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter U.N. Conference]; Charles Lipson, Why Are Some International
Agreements Informal?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS, A PROBLEMORIENTED APPROACH 39 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff et al. eds., 2002) (The U.S. has indicated that
the Convention is “the authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice.”). See
United Nations, Treaty Series, available at
http://untreaty.un.org/sample/EnglishInternetBible/partI/chapterXXIII/treaty1.htm (last
visited Nov. 1. 2005) (while the U.S. has signed the treaty, it has not ratified it).
71
72
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and purpose.”77 The relevant “context” includes, “in addition to
the text, including its preamble and annexes[,]” any agreements
or instruments agreed to or accepted by “all the parties in
connexion [sic] with the conclusion of the treaty.”78 In addition to
context, the primary guideposts to interpretation are: (1)
“subsequent agreement[s]” regarding the treaty’s “interpretation”
or “application;” (2) “subsequent practice in the application of the
treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding
its interpretation;” and (3) “any relevant rules of international
law.”79 The commentary indicates that some dispute exists as to
the relative weight to be given to each of the guideposts to
interpretation, but concludes that most jurists recognize “the
primacy of the text as the basis for the interpretation.”80
Scholars endeavoring to interpret Article 51 to determine
when the right of self-defense arises have employed methods of
interpretation similar to those endorsed by the Vienna
Convention, but have drawn different conclusions. The more
restrictive position holds that Article 51 forecloses a state’s
ability to use force in self-defense before an armed attack occurs.
The more permissive position holds that an armed attack need
not occur before force may be used in self-defense.81 Instead,
force may be used in anticipation of an attack, in a manner that
has been dubbed “anticipatory self-defence.”82 Force used in an
anticipatory act of self-defense must still meet the necessity and
proportionality requirements of customary international law, and
in the context of anticipatory self-defense, the former
requirement demands a showing that the threat is imminent.83
The Bush administration asserted that this second, permissive
viewpoint represents a centuries-old consensus as to the scope of
Furthermore, the administration regards the
the right.84
preemptive strategy enunciated in the NSS as an allowable
U.N. Conference, supra note 76.
U.N. Conference, supra note 76, at art. 31.
U.N. Conference, supra note 76, at art. 31.
Lipson, supra note 76, at 58 (“[S]upplementary means of interpretation, including
the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the
meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: (a) leaves the meaning
ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or
unreasonable.”). The preparatory work of the treaty is thus not referenced here.
81 See Gray, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 25, at 600 (summarizing the
restrictive and permissive positions).
82 See Gray, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 25, at 600.
83 See Gray, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 25, at 600; Simma, supra note 29, at
803 (while rejecting the permissibility of anticipatory self-defense under Article 51, noting
that scholars who believe that anticipatory self-defense can be lawful nevertheless require
it to be a necessary and proportional response to an imminent threat).
84 NSS, supra note 2, at 15.
77
78
79
80
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application of the right of self-defense as understood pursuant to
the permissive position.85
1. Treaty Text
Analysis of Article 51 in light of the Vienna Convention
sheds light on the disagreement between the restrictive and
permissive schools of thought. The text of Article 51 uses the
phrase “if an armed attack occurs” to describe the situation in
which the Charter’s operation will not “impair” the right of selfdefense.86 Those advocating the restrictive view may argue
compellingly that this language indicates that an actual—rather
than a potential—armed attack is needed to trigger the right to
use force in self-defense.87 An armed attack is an event capable
of being perceived and identified as such, and like any other
event, “occurs” when it “come[s] into existence” or “happen[s],”
and not before.88 Thus, an armed attack must actually happen
before it can truly be said that “[n]othing in the . . . Charter” will
“impair the inherent right of . . . self-defence.”89 Accordingly,
only an armed attack that is happening or has happened can
satisfy Article 51’s armed attack requirement.90
Moreover, the structure of the language used in Article 51
bolsters the restrictive position. Article 51 impliedly recognizes a
general rule of impairment of the right of self-defense when it
states that nothing in the Charter will “impair” the right “if an
armed attack occurs.”91 The Article would arguably be devoid of
meaning if special provisions did not have to be made in order to
preserve a right of self-defense.92 Thus, the Charter must
generally operate to impair the right of self-defense; only in
exceptional cases will it be deemed unimpaired. The occurrence
of an armed attack gives rise to the only situation in which the
Charter states that the right of self-defense is not impaired,
however “inherent” it may be.93 A familiar canon of construction
holds that the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of other
things; as applied to Article 51, this suggests that explicit
NSS, supra note 2, at 15.
U.N. Charter art. 51.
Eckert & Mofidi, supra note 15, at 137-38.
WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 817 (1991).
U.N. Charter art. 51.
See, e.g., S. Murphy, supra note 65, at 44; Quincy Wright, The Prevention of
Aggression, 50 AM. J. INT’L L. 514, 529 (1956); Simma, supra note 29, at 803.
91 Eckert & Mofidi, supra note 15, at 137 (quoting U.N. Charter art. 51).
92 See BROWNLIE, supra note 44, at 273 (making this point, and stating that “where
the Charter has a specific provision relating to a particular legal category, to assert that
this does not restrict the wider ambit of the customary law relating to that category or
problem is to go beyond the bounds of logic. Why have treaty provisions at all?”).
93 Simma, supra note 29, at 790.
85
86
87
88
89
90
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exceptions to the general rule of impairment of the right of selfdefense should be deemed exclusive.94 Thus, the language should
be read to mean that the Charter has rendered the right of selfdefense unavailable prior to the occurrence of an armed attack.
On the other hand, advocates of a permissive interpretation
contend that that the text of Article 51 does not purport to grant
a right of self-defense to states.95 The language of Article 51
assumes that such a right already existed when the Charter was
signed; indeed, the right is said to be an “inherent” aspect of the
sovereignty of states.96 Article 51’s recognition that states’ selfdefense rights are “inherent,” which is defined as “involved in
[states’] constitution[s] or essential character” and “belonging by
nature” to states, suggests that the argument for a restrictive
approach should be turned on its head.97 The Charter’s drafters
described the right of self-defense as “inherent” because they
deemed it a fundamental attribute of state sovereignty.98
Therefore, Article 51 should not be read as restricting the right of
self-defense, but as clarifying the right’s continued existence,
because the drafters would have been explicit if they wished to
place limitations on a right they considered so important.99
Scholars adopting a permissive approach endeavor to
interpret the phrase “an armed attack” in a manner consistent
with their position.100 Some view the armed attack requirement
as a reference not only to actual interstate violence, but also to
actions taken in preparation for the attack.101 Thus, an armed
94 See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992) (referencing this
canon); BROWNLIE, supra note 44, at 273 (applying the canon).
95 See, e.g., Abraham D. Sofaer, The Sixth Annual Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in
International Law: Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 126 MIL. L. REV. 89,
92-93 (1989); John Alan Cohan, The Bush Doctrine and the Emerging Norm of
Anticipatory Self-Defense in Customary International Law, 15 PACE INT’L L. REV. 283, 316
(2003).
96 See U.N. Charter art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations.”).
97 See WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 622 (1991).
98 U.N. Charter art. 51; see JULIUS STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER: A
CRITIQUE OF UNITED NATIONS THEORIES OF AGGRESSION 43-44, 44 n.13 (1958) (referring
to the “continued vigour” of the concept of self-defense and assumption on the part of
states that treaty provisions would not and could not eliminate this “natural right”);
Sofaer, supra note 95, at 94.
99 STONE, supra note 98, at 43-44; see Sofaer, supra note 95, at 94.
100 U.N. Charter art. 51.
101 See, e.g., Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, The New Bush National Security
Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 375, 425 n.212 (2004) (quoting Sir
Humphrey Waldock); American Soc’y of Int’l Law, Self-Defense in an Age of Terrorism, 97
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 141, 148 (2003) (suggesting the permissibility of “nipping an
armed attack in the bud”). To the extent that the latter position rejects the concept of
preemptive self-defense, it allows a state to exercise self-defense when it is positive an
imminent attack will occur. It is reactionary rather than anticipatory self-defense, and is
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attack may be said to have occurred when some state of
preparation is reached, even before one state actually strikes
another.102 The definition of “armed attack” must encompass
more than the ultimate act of interstate violence; otherwise, the
right would be deprived of the broad scope seemingly appropriate
to a right inherent in statehood.103 An alternative explanation is
that Article 51 does not require an armed attack, but merely
states one instance in which the customary right of self-defense
is preserved.104 This second understanding is difficult to square
with the structure of Article 51. However, the recognized
inherent and fundamental need for self-defense against
imminent attack,105 in addition to states’ interpretation of the
provision,106 may be viewed as justifications for the second
reading of Article 51.
The Vienna Convention’s “General Rule of Interpretation”
does not limit the scope of the “text” considered by an interpreter
to the specific portion under scrutiny, but instead calls for
examination of the whole “text, including its preamble and
annexes,” to aid in interpretation.107 The restrictive school of
thought points to numerous aspects of the Charter that suggest
that the avenues left open for the legitimate use of force were
meant to be narrow. According to the restrictive view, the scope
of the right to self-defense recognized in Article 51 is diminished
by the temporal limitation in the armed attack requirement and
the Article’s command that the exercise of the right by the states
is “immediately reported to the Security Council.”108 Moreover,
the text explains that force used in self-defense must cease when
the Council “take[s] measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security.”109 If the “inherent” quality of
the right of self-defense is as important to interpreting Article 51
as the permissive position posits — supposedly relaxing or
eliminating the text’s requirement of an armed attack — it seems
unusual that the right of self-defense would be made contingent
included in this part of the discussion because, although it involves reaction, using force
in self-defense in instances suggested by this view still precedes the occurrence of any
interstate violence.
102 See Nagan & Hammer, supra note 101.
103 See BROWNLIE, supra note 44, at 273 (suggesting the need for a broad
interpretation of inherent right); U.N. Charter art. 51 (outlining the inherent right of the
states).
104 See Gray, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 25, at 600.
105 Martinez, supra note 16, at 162-63 (making this argument and referencing
numerous sources in accord).
106 THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND
ARMED ATTACKS 50 (2002).
107 U.N. Conference, supra note 76.
108 U.N. Charter art. 51.
109 Id.
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upon notification, and subject to limitation by action of a body
beyond the state’s control.
With respect to Article 51’s interaction with Article 2(4),
those urging a restrictive interpretation of the temporal scope of
the self-defense right can again invoke the canon that explicit
exceptions are deemed exclusive. The general prohibition on the
use of force yields only to a limited number of explicit exceptions,
including the occurrence of an armed attack.110 If an armed
attack “occurs” when interstate violence actually “happen[s]” and
not before, the argument that another, different right of selfdefense may be relied upon before interstate violence actually
occurs runs afoul of sound textual interpretation.111
The right of self-defense recognized in Article 51 is merely an
exception to the general prohibition on the use of force contained
in Article 2(4).112 This suggests that “[t]he use of force in selfdefense is limited to situations where the state is truly required
to defend itself from serious attack. In such situations, the state
must carry the burden of presenting evidence to support its
actions, normally before these irreversible and irreparable
measures are taken.”113 Thus, the Charter affirmatively requires
U.N. members to rely on alternatives to force to resolve their
disputes,114 and suggests a number of peaceful means by which
this obligation may be discharged.115 An annex to the Charter
was included to give concrete form to one vehicle for peaceful
dispute resolution, the International Court of Justice, the
“function [of which] is to decide in accordance with international
law such disputes as are submitted to it.”116 Also relevant in this
context is the Charter’s preamble, which explains a central focus
of the Charter: the common interest in keeping forcible

See, e.g., S. Murphy, supra note 65, at 44.
See THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH 941 (1995) (defining
“occur”).
112 See Simma, supra note 29, at 117, 128, 789 (referring to the prohibition of the use
of force found in Article 2(4) as the “general” rule and self-defense as an “exception” to
that rule). Adherents of a restrictive view of the self-defense right may argue that the
exceptional status of self-defense warrants a narrow construction of the right. See Gray,
USE OF FORCE, supra note 15, at 86-87, 600 (reciting this argument).
113 Charney, supra note 69, at 835-36 (criticizing a broad interpretation of the right of
self-defense on the ground that it would conflict with “core” objectives specified in the
Charter, including the ‘prevent[ion of] states from using force in international relations to
promote their policy agendas no matter how just,” as well as with the objectives of selfdefense itself).
114 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 3.
115 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 33 (“[States] shall, first of all, seek a solution by
negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to
regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means.”).
116 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat.
1055, 1060.
110
111
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exchanges between states to a minimum.117
A restrictive
interpretation of Article 51 thus suggests that so long as an
“armed attack” remains a possibility rather than an actuality,
the Charter’s commands to settle disputes peacefully and to
avoid the use of force preclude a state from resorting to arms.118
Lastly, the Charter’s other significant exception to the
prohibition of the use of force allows for its use pursuant to
Security Council decisions.119 Article 1(1) expresses a preference
for the use of “collective measures” as a means of “maintain[ing]
international peace and security.”120 Article 24 reflects the same
preference for collective over unilateral action in that it
established that United Nations “[m]embers confer on the
Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security.”121 This preference is further
reinforced by the textually subordinate status of self-defense
under Article 51, as noted above, in relation to Security Council
action.122 Arguably, these aspects of the text are incompatible
with an interpretation of Article 51 that leaves a state free to use
force against another state before the Security Council has an
opportunity to consider the situation.123
Those favoring a permissive approach to interpretation of
the right of self-defense are likely to view the same portions of
the text differently. First, with respect to the provisions for
Security Council involvement found in Article 51, they regard the
notification requirement as no more than an administrative or
procedural matter, imposing no limits on the substantive scope of
the right enjoyed by the state acting in self-defense.124 As such,
the fact that a party exercising the right must give notice to the
Security Council should not be read to suggest that the right
ought to be narrowly construed.125 The Council’s apparent ability
117 See U.N. Charter pmbl. (listing reasons why the United Nations was founded; the
first reason listed is “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice
in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind”).
118 Eckert & Mofidi, supra note 15, at 137-38.
119 U.N. Charter arts. 39, 42 (permitting the Security Council to authorize force
“necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security” if it “determine[s] the
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression”).
120 U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1.
121 U.N. Charter art. 24.
122 See U.N. Charter, supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
123 See Charney, supra note 69, at 837 (condemning unilateral uses of force in selfdefense in situations where a state could instead resort to the Security Council’s
enforcement procedures, on the ground that “the Council, and the United Nations as a
whole, should be the primary vehicle to respond to threats and to breaches of the peace”).
124 See generally Gray, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 25, at 90-91 (noting,
however, that failure to follow the notification procedure will have a deleterious impact on
a state’s claim to have acted in self-defense).
125 Simma, supra note 29, at 804 n.152 (noting that the “reporting duty” is “rarely
complied with” and has been “devoid of practical significance” because of the frequent
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to terminate a properly-exercised right of self-defense is of little
importance to the issue that divides the restrictive and
permissive schools of thought — the time when the right may
first be asserted.126 By the terms of the Charter, the right of selfdefense can be limited only when the Council acts, and then only
when it takes “measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security.”127 Moreover, in practice, this limitation has
little effectiveness, as states have exercised what amounts to
“concurrent power” with the Council in continuing to defend
themselves even after taking “measures,” and possess a wide
degree of discretion in deciding when the Council’s action has
superseded their right to use force in self-defense.128 For these
reasons, the Council’s ability to terminate the exercise of a state’s
right to self-defense should not significantly detract from Article
51’s recognition of self-defense as an inherent right worthy of the
liberal interpretation given to it by the permissive school.
Additionally, the preference for collective over individual action
to “maintain international peace and security” should not be
interpreted to imply that the collectivism favored by the Charter
is at odds with a broad interpretation of the right of self-defense,
because the self-defense right recognized in Article 51 is itself
capable of being exercised in a “collective” fashion.129
Permissive writers claim that the aforementioned canon of
construction should not exclude anticipatory self-defense unless
Article 51’s reference to an armed attack intends to foreclose
anticipatory action.130 In their view, the canon is inapplicable
because the language requiring an “armed attack” applies only
when “the Security Council is acting” and takes “measures

inefficacy of the Security Council”). But see Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, para. 235 (June 27) (suggesting that the fact that a state failed to
report to the Security Council is significant to analysis of the state’s claim of a right to use
force in self-defense under the Charter ).
126 The issue of whether preemptive self-defense is permissible relates to the
availability, not the termination, of the self-defense right. To the extent that it is argued
that the Security Council’s ability to terminate a state’ s recourse to the right is relevant
to interpreting the right as it relates to preemptive force, it should be noted that the
ability of the Security Council to terminate the right has had very little practical impact.
See FRANCK, supra note 106, at 50 (noting that while Article 51 as drafted grants the
Security Council the ability to terminate a state’s use of force in self-defense, the
“coexistence of collective measures with the continued measures in self-defense has
become accepted practice”).
127 U.N. Charter art. 51.
128 See FRANCK, supra note 106, at 49.
129 U.N. Charter art. 51; Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82
MICH. L. REV. 1620, 1639 (1984) [hereinafter Schachter, The Right of States].
130 See STONE, supra note 98, at 44 n.14. (“Any reference based on inclusio unius
exclusio alterius is neutralized by the clear reference of what is included to the situation
where the Security Council is acting.”).
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necessary to maintain international peace and security.”131
States’ obligation to settle disputes peacefully is inapposite,
because it has already been breached by the time a state
exercises its right of self-defense.132 If the right to use force in
self-defense extends to situations preceding the armed attack, a
permissive understanding of the right suggests that at some
point in a potential attacker’s preparations, the potential
defender’s obligation to settle disputes peacefully must yield by
reason of the potential attacker’s decision to resort to force.133
2. Context and Subsequent Agreements
The text of a treaty, although perceived by many scholars to
be of primary importance to the task of interpretation, is not the
only relevant consideration.
According to the Vienna
Convention, the treaty’s “context” should be considered, and
certain other items should be “taken into account.”134 Aside from
its own text, the Charter lacks a relevant “context” as defined by
the Vienna Convention.135 The Vienna Convention also calls for
consideration of “subsequent agreement[s] between the parties”
pertaining to the treaty.136 Unlike agreements and instruments
entered “in connexion [sic]with the conclusion of the treaty to be
interpreted,” which form part of the treaty’s “context” and must
receive the backing of all other parties to the treaty, subsequent
agreements may be relevant to interpretation of a treaty even if
they have not been assented to by “all” the parties to the treaty
under scrutiny.137 Therefore, agreements postdating the Charter
that are not backed by all parties to it may still be relevant to the
Charter’s interpretation. As a result, a number of widely
supported General Assembly resolutions may provide insight into
131 See U.N. Charter art. 51; STONE, supra note 98, at 44 (asserting that “where the
Security Council is not acting, the broader license of self-defence and self-redress under
customary international law must surely continue to exist,” and that Article 51 should not
be read to eliminate states’ “license” to justify uses of force based on customary rules so
long as the “Council is not acting, [and] there is no inconsistency with the purposes of the
United Nations”).
132 Schachter, The Right of States, supra note 129, at 1635.
133 See Simma, supra note 29, at 108-09 (stating that, in principle, this obligation
“presupposes a right to existence for the party concerned and thus a right to respect for its
integrity” and adding that “[t]o the extent that the use of force is permissible, an
obligation to settle a dispute peacefully cannot exist”).
134 U.N. Conference, supra note 76.
135 U.N. Conference, supra note 76 (To the author’s knowledge, there were no formal
agreements or understandings made both at the time of and in connection with the
conclusion of the Charter to which all the parties to the treaty assented that bore directly
on the issue of the legitimate timing of force used in self-defense.)
136 U.N. Conference, supra note 76, at art. 31; see Simma, supra note 29, at 108-09
(stating that this obligation “presupposes a right to existence for the party concerned and
thus a right to respect for its integrity[,]” and adding that “[t]o the extent that the use of
force is permissible, an obligation to settle a dispute peacefully cannot exist”).
137 U.N. Conference, supra note 76.
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Article 51’s interpretation. Although none of these resolutions go
directly to the scope of permissible self-defense, what they have
to say about the use of force as a general matter may still be
relevant to interpreting the scope of permissible self-defense. 138
The 1965 U.N. Declaration on the Inadmissibility of
Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection
of Their Independence and Sovereignty (Declaration on the
Inadmissibility of Intervention) rejects the use of force in
international relations. It declares that “[n]o State may use or
encourage the use of . . . measures to coerce another State . . . to
secure from it advantages of any kind,” and further enjoins
States from engaging in “activities directed towards the violent
overthrow of the régime of another State.”139 This language may
be understood to condemn acts of self-defense undertaken before,
or too far in advance of, the occurrence of an armed attack.
However, the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention
goes on to disavow any intention that its language is meant to
“affect[] in any manner the relevant provisions of the Charter.”140
The 1970 U.N. Declaration on Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among
States In Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
(Declaration on Friendly Relations) demands that states “refrain
from the threat or use of force . . . as a means of solving
international disputes,” and affirms that “[a] war of aggression
constitutes a crime against the peace” which gives rise to
The Declaration on Friendly
criminal “responsibility.”141
Relations provides support for the notion that the right of selfdefense is limited rather than open-ended by declaring that
forcible “acts of reprisal” are impermissible.142 Additionally, the
Declaration on Friendly Relations indicates that the obligation to
settle disputes peacefully continues even after initial attempts to
do so have failed.143 It is hard to reconcile a process in which all
parties earnestly endeavor to peacefully settle a dispute with the
138 GRAY, USE OF FORCE, supra note 15, at 112; Gray, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
note 25, at 601.
139 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of
States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131 (XX), ¶
1, U.N. Doc. A/2131 (Dec. 21, 1965).
140 Id. at ¶ 8.
141 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A.
Res. 2625 (XXV), ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970) [hereinafter Declaration on
Friendly Relations].
142 Id.; see, e.g., CASSESE, supra note 46, at 217 (stating that the principles the
Declaration on Friendly Relations articulates are often treated as a reflection of
customary international law).
143 Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 141. But see CASSESE, supra note
46, at 217 (noting that states are “not duty bound to settle those disputes at any cost”).
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use of force in advance — or too far in advance — of an armed
attack by another disputant, the occurrence of which remains
speculative before violence is brought to bear.144
An overhasty act of self-defense might well run afoul of a
third Assembly resolution, the Definition of Aggression, which
states, “[t]he first use of armed force by a State in contravention
of the Charter shall constitute prima facie evidence of an act of
aggression.”145 The resolution’s definition of “[a]ggression” may
be rebutted only pursuant to a Council determination.146 No
justifications for aggression are identified.147
Like the
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention, however, both
the Declaration of Friendly Relations and the Definition of
Aggression contain language indicating that they are not
intended to change the Charter’s scope or meaning.148
Those favoring a restrictive interpretation of the self-defense
right can argue that the aforementioned resolutions are
consistent with their view. Specifically, their view is a narrow
reading of the right that limits its assertion to situations in
which the Charter clearly recognizes its existence—namely,
when one state is then undertaking or has already undertaken
an “armed attack” against the defender.149 Adherents of the
permissive position may counter that none of the resolutions
cited explicitly purports to construe the right of self-defense.150
Furthermore, those favoring a permissive interpretation may
argue that no inferences about the scope of the rules found in the
Charter should be drawn. They can ground this argument on
traditional reservations about the ability of General Assembly
resolutions to produce binding legal effects, and the caveats
expressly included in the resolutions that appear to foreclose
treatment of the resolutions as authoritative interpretations of
Martinez, supra note 16, at 170.
Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/3314 (Dec. 14,
1974) [hereinafter Definition of Aggression] (like the Declaration on Friendly Relations,
the Definition of Aggression has been cited as a reflection, at least in part, of customary
international law); see Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J 14,
103 (June 27).
146 Definition of Aggression, supra note 145, at art. 2.
147 Definition of Aggression, supra note 145, at art. 5.
148 See Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 141, at ¶ 1 (“Nothing in the
foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as enlarging or diminishing in any way the scope
of the provisions of the Charter concerning cases in which the use of force is lawful.”);
Definition of Aggression, supra note 145, at art. 6 (“Nothing in this Definition shall be
construed as in any way enlarging or diminishing the scope of the Charter, including its
provisions concerning cases in which the use of force is lawful.”).
149 U.N. Charter art. 51; Schachter, In Defense of International Rules, supra note 63,
at 120.
150 GRAY, USE OF FORCE, supra note 15, at 112; GRAY, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
note 25, at 601.
144
145
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the Charter.151 Those preferring a restrictive approach could
respond that the limiting clauses of the resolutions are better
understood, not as impediments to the use of the resolutions in
construing the Charter, but as indications that the resolutions
are intended to restate the Charter’s meaning rather than to
modify it.152 Moreover, resolutions such as the Declaration on
Friendly Relations, which received overwhelming support in the
General Assembly, may be relevant both to interpreting Article
51 and to independently determining the legality of the use of
force by contributing to the development of customary
international law.153
3. State Practice
The Vienna Convention also calls for consideration of “any
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation.”154 On several occasions since the founding of the
United Nations, states have used force in a manner seemingly
akin to anticipatory self-defense.155 The U.S. naval blockade of
151 See CASSESE, supra note 46, at 160-61 (characterizing General Assembly
resolutions as ‘soft law’ capable of indicating new trends and concerns but unable to
impose legally binding obligations); Simma, supra note 29, at 269 (acknowledging that
Assembly resolutions are nonbinding and that it has been “controversial” to ascribe legal
effect to them).
152 The language used in the resolutions seem to express an intention that the
resolutions be viewed as efforts to restate rather than to develop the law. See, e.g.,
Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 141, at ¶ 1 (declaring only that the
resolution shall not “be construed as enlarging or diminishing in any way the scope of the
provisions of the Charter”). Arguments that the Assembly included these clauses to
express its intent that these resolutions should be regarded as having no legal import
even though international law was the subject matter of the resolutions leads to the
absurd conclusion that the Assembly acted for no reason.
153 CASSESE, supra note 46, at 292-93 (noting that significant resolutions may
“gradually generate[] the possible crystallization of general binding rules or principles”);
Simma, supra note 29, at 268-73 (describing different theories of the extent to which
General Assembly resolutions can produce legal effects, and adding that “[i]t is widely
acknowledged that [Assembly] resolutions may under certain circumstances constitute
evidence of existing customary law”); see also Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar.
v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 101, 103 (June 27) (noting that states’ adoption of the Declaration
on Friendly Relations was an indication of their opinio juris as to customary international
law, and that the Definition of Aggression could be “taken to reflect customary
international law”).
154 U.N. Conference, supra note 76.
155 Other examples have also been cited as instances of the assertion of a right of
anticipatory self-defense, but are not discussed here at length because the force used in
each – whether lawful or not – is better described as responsive. See Martinez, supra note
16, at 140-43 (citing U.S. air strikes against Libya in 1986 after the bombing of a German
nightclub frequented by Americans, U.S. missile strikes against Iraq in 1993 after its
attempts to assassinate former President Bush, and U.S. missile strikes against Sudan
and Afghanistan in 1998 after bombings of American embassies). To the extent that
these instances were ones in which states argued for anticipatory self-defense, none can
be said to have resulted in the unequivocal acceptance or rejection of the doctrine. See
GRAY, USE OF FORCE, supra note 15, at 116-18.
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Cuba during the Cuban missile crisis has been cited as an
example of a case in which preemptive or anticipatory selfdefense was used with international approval.156 The blockade
should properly be regarded as a use of force157 and was
apparently undertaken to forestall the installation and possible
future use of Soviet nuclear-armed missiles in Cuba.158 However,
while commentators debated the applicability of the right of selfdefense, the official U.S. position did not attempt to justify the
blockade on that ground.159 Instead, it sought to justify it as a
measure taken by a regional organization, the Organization of
American States, pursuant to Article 52.160 The American
unwillingness to rely on the right of self-defense, especially in
view of the strong tendency of states to advance self-defense to
legitimize their uses of force,161 suggests that the U.S. believed
that self-defense would have been heavily contested as a
justification.162 Even to the extent that self-defense was raised in
discussions in the Council, it cannot be said that the Council
recognized the Cuban blockade as legitimate, as opinion was
sharply divided, and it is uncertain whether supporters of the
U.S. position were motivated by Cold War alliance considerations
or by the U.S.’s proffered justifications.163 Thus, the Cuban
blockade provides no real support for a permissive interpretation
of the Charter.
A second oft-cited example is the Israeli air-strike against
Egypt at the start of the Six-Day War in 1967. Prior to the air
strike, the objective of was to destroy Egypt’s Air Force. Egypt
had taken a number of provocative actions in short succession
that made the onset of hostilities appear imminent, including
closing the Straits of Tiran to Israeli traffic.164 The Israeli strike

See Van den hole, supra note 22, at 101.
BROWNLIE, supra note 44, at 365-66.
WILLIAM R. KEYLOR, THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY WORLD: AN INTERNATIONAL
HISTORY 315 (4th ed. 2001).
159 Quincy Wright, The Cuban Quarantine, 57 AM. J. INT’L L. 546, 554, 560 (1963)
[hereinafter Wright, The Cuban Quarantine] (noting that the U.S.’s “main argument” was
that the quarantine was justified by “Articles 6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty of 1947,”
implemented by a branch of the Organization of American States).
160 Id. at 557-59 (setting out the U.S. argument). The claim that the Cuban blockade
could be justified as an enforcement action by a regional organization is belied by Article
52. See U.N. Charter, art. 52, para. 1 (“[N]o enforcement action shall be taken under
regional arrangements . . . without the authorization of the Security Council . . . .”).
161 Gardner, in LAW AND FORCE, supra note 36, at 52.
162 GRAY, USE OF FORCE, supra note 15, at 112.
163 See Sean M. Condron, Justification for Unilateral Action in Response to the Iraqi
Threat: A Critical Analysis of Operation Desert Fox, 161 MIL. L. REV. 115, 136 (1999)
(noting the split of opinion, which reflected Cold War divisions, but erroneously
suggesting that the split reflected no ideological divide).
164 KEYLOR, supra note 158, at 341-42.
156
157
158
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preceded any interstate violence undertaken by Egypt.165 Israel
sought to justify its action on grounds of self-defense, arguing
that the actions taken by Egypt amounted to an armed attack.166
The Council again split along ideological lines, with the Western
bloc supporting the Israeli action and the Soviet bloc opposed to
it.167 However, unlike the example of the Cuban blockade, Israel
justified its 1967 air raid on the basis of self-defense.168
However, Israel’s justification was one of ordinary rather than
anticipatory self-defense: it argued that the closing of the Straits
was not merely preparation for war, but was tantamount to an
armed attack.169 In any event, the U.N. institutions did not
explicitly accept or reject the Israeli claim.170
A third historical example appears to have received more
attention from commentators than the two previously discussed,
probably because it presented facts most implicative of the
debate over anticipatory self-defense. In 1981, Israel launched
another air-raid, this time against an Iraqi nuclear facility under
construction near Baghdad.171 While the facility was not yet
operable, and speculative arguments could have been made as to
its potential future use as a means of producing nuclear weapons,
it was clear that at the time of the strike, the unfinished and
inoperative reactor posed no threat to other states.172 Reliance
on a right of preemptive self-defense was unavoidable: Israel
aimed to justify its use of force by claiming that force was used to
defend against a threat that would become imminent only in the
KEYLOR, supra note 158, at 341-42.
Quincy Wright, Legal Aspects of the Middle East Situation, 33 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBLEMS 5, 26-27 (1968) [hereinafter Wright, Middle East Situation] (noting the Israeli
justification was accompanied by an admission that its air raid was preceded by any
Egyptian attack); Martinez, supra note 16, at 138-39.
167 See Condron, supra note 163, at 137.
168 Beth M. Polebaum, Note, National Self-Defense in International Law: An
Emerging Standard for a Nuclear Age, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 187, 191 (1984).
169 Wright, Middle East Situation, supra note 166, at 26 (noting that Israel claimed
that Egypt’s closing of the Straits of Tiran was an “armed attack”); see also Condron,
supra note 163, at 136 (discussing the United Arab Republic’s closing of the Straits of
Tiran and Israel’s previously issued statement that such closing “would constitute an act
of war”); Martinez, supra note 16, at 138-39 (stating that Israel claimed the “totality of
the actions of Egypt, Jordan and Syria in fact amounted to a prior armed attack.”
Therefore, Israel, as such, relied in part on “traditional self-defense.”).
170 Wright, Middle East Situation, supra note 166, at 9-11, 27 (describing U.N.
discussions and resolutions that were inconclusive as to the Israel’s claim to have acted in
self defense, and noting in the context of a discussion of responsibility for aggression that
substantial arguments existed to support viewing either side as having acted aggressively
rather than defensively); Shabtai Rosenne, Directions for a Middle East Settlement—
Some Underlying Legal Problems, 33 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 44, 55 (1968) (noting that
efforts in the U.N. bodies to “attribute responsibility for the breakdown of peace to one
side or another” had been unsuccessful).
171 Martinez, supra note 16, at 139.
172 Martinez, supra note 16, at 139; SINGH, supra note 39, at 46.
165
166
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future.173 The action was met with widespread disapproval, but
for different reasons. Some states took a position consistent with
the restrictive view and argued that no action of the kind taken
could ever be consistent with the Charter.174 Specifically, Article
51 had limited the scope of the right, making it exercisable only
“if an armed attack occurs.”175 Conversely, other states based
their objection to the Israeli action on customary law grounds,
arguing that the Israeli strike did not comport with the
The U.S.
requirements of necessity and proportionality.176
condemned Israel only for its failure to exhaust peaceful means
of resolving the dispute.177 The U.N. political organs thus
condemned the attack without reaching a consensus as to the
scope of the right of self-defense.178
The historical practice of U.N. members in dealing with
claims of anticipatory self-defense suggests that states are not in
agreement as to the propriety under Article 51 of actions taken in
self-defense prior to the onset of an armed attack. While some
states agree that the right of self-defense includes the right of
states to deploy force before military force is deployed against
States rely
them, this is not the majority viewpoint.179
infrequently on anticipatory self-defense to justify the use of
force; instead, they attempt when possible to characterize their
actions as supported by the less controversial right of states to
use force defensively in response to an armed attack that has
occurred or is occurring.180
4. Relevant Rules of International Law: Customary
Principles of Necessity and Proportionality
Customary international law has an important role to play
in an analysis of the legality of the use of force in self-defense.
First, according to the interpretive framework set forth in the
Vienna Convention, “relevant rules of international law
applicable in the relations between the parties” to the Charter
must be considered as an aspect of the Charter’s “context” to
arrive at a proper understanding of the scope of the right of selfGeneral rules of customary
defense recognized therein.181
See Gray, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 25, at 601.
Martinez, supra note 16, at 133-34.
U.N. Charter art. 51.
See Martinez, supra note 16, at 139-40.
See Martinez, supra note 16, at 139-40 (stating that the U.N. Security Council and
the United States condemned Israel’s actions and the U.S. specifically admonished Israel
for its failure to exhaust peaceful means of dispute resolution).
178 Gray, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 25, at 601.
179 GRAY, USE OF FORCE, supra note 15, at 111-12, 115.
180 Id. at 115; see also S. Murphy, supra note 65, at 44.
181 U.N. Conference, supra note 76.
173
174
175
176
177
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international law are as valid and applicable in relations
between the parties to the Charter as are the provisions of the
Charter itself.182 The obligations imposed by customary rules
exist independently of any treaty provision.183
The customary rules factor significantly in the analysis of
the availability, timing, and permissible scope of the use of force
in self-defense. Many writers cite the early formulation of these
rules found in a diplomatic note from U.S. Secretary of State
Daniel Webster to the British ambassador in 1842.184 The note
concerned the sinking of an American ship, the Caroline, by the
British, which was done in order to prevent the ship from being
used to support rebels opposed to the British colonial
government.185 The U.S. demanded that the British justify their
action by showing that the “‘necessity of that self-defense [wa]s
instant and overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and
The American note also
no moment for deliberation.’”186
demanded a showing that the force used involved nothing
“‘unreasonable or excessive.’”187 Although this note long predated
the Charter, and was thus the product of a time when resorting
to force was not unlawful in the sense of the prohibition in Article
2(4),188 it contains a useful elaboration of the customary
constraints on self-defense.189 As the letter indicates, use of force
in lawful self-defense must always be both necessary and
proportionate.190
The concept of necessity limits the use of force to situations
in which forcible “measures . . . are . . . necessary to respond to”
the armed attack191 or to otherwise repel aggression.192 Peaceful
182 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 118, at art. 38(1)(a)(d) (identifying sources of international law). The United States has argued in the past
that the doctrines of necessity and proportionality have been “supervene[d] and
subsume[d]” by the prohibition on force in the Charter, and the International Court has
rejected this argument. See Military and Paramilitary Activities, (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986
I.C.J. 14, at 93 (June 27) (“Principles such as those of the non-use of force . . . continue to
be binding as part of customary international law, despite the operation of provisions of
conventional law in which they have been incorporated . . . .”) (citation and internal
quotations omitted).
183 See Thirlway, supra note 24, at 124-25.
184 Schachter, The Right of States, supra note 129, at 1634.
185 Schachter, The Right of States, supra note 129, at 1634-35; Eckert & Mofidi, supra
note 15, at 129.
186 Eckert & Mofidi, supra note 15, at 130 (quoting BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R.
TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1222 (1991)).
187 Eckert & Mofidi, supra note 15, at 130 (quoting BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R.
TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1222 (1991)).
188 SHAW, supra note 50, at 682-85 (providing a brief summary of law governing the
use of force in international relations).
189 Eckert & Mofidi, supra note 15, at 129-30.
190 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 103 (June 27).
191 See id. (explaining that Article 51 does not itself require acts taken in self-defense
to be “proportional” and “necessary;” Article 51 does not purport to supersede these
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alternatives must not have been readily available to the state
invoking self-defense.193 The law recognizes that the use of force
in self-defense may be necessary for a variety of reasons, such as
“to hold the aggressor in check and prevent him from continuing
the aggression,” “to recover territory” recently lost to the
attacker, or to “repel an attack.”194 The aim of force used in selfdefense cannot be “retaliatory or punitive.”195 When states rely
upon anticipatory self-defense, scholars who accept that doctrine
as a valid justification for the use of force generally accept that
the requirement of necessity demands a showing that the threat
was imminent.196
The proportionality requirement, on the other hand, limits
the amount and scope of the force that may be used to fulfill the
need to defend.197 The concept that forcible “measures . . . [must
be] proportional to the armed attack”198 does not demand that the
defending state limit the size or sophistication of its forces;199 nor
does it categorically compel a state fighting off an invasion to
stop its use of force as soon as the invaders are pushed back
beyond the border.200 However, the force used in self-defense
must be “proportional to the offense in its extent, manner, and
The proportionality requirement’s prohibition of
goal.”201
“unreasonable or excessive” conduct is, in a sense, similar to the
necessity requirement’s prohibition of “forbidden” conduct
because in both instances, the conduct that is not permitted will
vary with the circumstances.202 Sufficient force may be used to
respond to armed attacks to ensure decisive results, even if to
achieve them would require modest increases in the force used or
In general, to be
spatial expansions of the conflict.203
requirements of customary international law).
192 Gray, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 25, at 600; see also CASSESE, supra note
46, at 305 (arguing that the use of self-defense must be limited to “rejecting the armed
attack”).
193 Schachter, The Right of States, supra note 129, at 1635 (agreeing with this
proposition but recognizing its limits).
194 CASSESE, supra note 46, at 305; Gray, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 25, at
600.
195 See Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 141 (“States have a duty to
refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force.”).
196 See, e.g., SINGH, supra note 39, at 16 (accepting anticipatory self-defense doctrine,
but acknowledging that the state invoking it must be able to show that the threat against
it was imminent or that there was a “strong probability of armed attack”); see also
Condron, supra note 163, at 130-31.
197 Schachter, The Right of States, supra note 129, at 1637.
198 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 94 (June 27).
199 See, e.g.,Van den hole, supra note 22, at 103-04.
200 Schachter, The Right of States, supra note 129, at 1637-38.
201 Schachter, In Defense of International Rules, supra note 63, at 120.
202 GRAY, USE OF FORCE, supra note 15, at 107.
203 See, e.g., Schachter, The Right of States, supra note 129, at 1637-38; Van den hole,
supra note 22, at 103-04.
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proportional to the attack, “the act, justified by the necessity of
self-defense, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly
within it.”204
Those favoring a restrictive approach to anticipatory selfdefense may argue that these customary doctrines, although
understood by some writers to permit anticipatory self-defense,
cannot properly be applied when anticipatory force is used.205
Determinations of necessity and proportionality, after all, “are
dependent on the facts of the particular case.”206 The facts of a
case cannot be meaningfully analyzed before they actually exist;
analysis before that time is merely speculation. Thus, one who
engages in anticipatory self-defense may thwart the application
of these rules because the need for force and the necessary
amount cannot be ascertained.207 Before the commencement of
an armed attack, the use of force in self-defense can only be
based on a guess as to the hostile intentions of the potential
attacker. If the guess is incorrect and the attack never would
have occurred or could have been peacefully prevented, then
there was no need for the use of defensive force in any
proportion.208 Indeed, according to some supporters of the
restrictive position, force used in anticipatory self-defense cannot
comply with the rules imposed by customary doctrines.209
Supporters of the permissive view contend that many writers
consider the customary rules to permit the use of anticipatory
self-defense.210 They seek to dispel fears about the potential for
anticipatory self-defense to encourage reckless uses of force by
reading the requirement of necessity as incorporating a
requirement of imminence.211 The requirement of imminence is
theoretically measurable even in the absence of an armed attack;
from an objective standpoint, the legality of the anticipatory
action can be assessed by considering the relevant facts at the
time defensive force was used.212 The burden of being subject to
the use of force initially falls upon the potential attacker, but in
See John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 740 (2004) (footnote omitted).
See BROWNLIE, supra note 44, at 257 (noting that many writers believe that
customary law permits anticipatory self-defense as a general matter, although apparently
disagreeing on the ground that anticipatory self-defense in fact subverts the application of
these rules).
206 GRAY, USE OF FORCE, supra note 15, at 107.
207 See BROWNLIE, supra note 44, at 259.
208 See MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM, The Myth of Preemptive Self-Defense 19 (2002),
http://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf.
209 See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 44, at 259, 261-62 (arguing that anticipatory force
cannot be used consistently with the proportionality requirement).
210 See, e.g., Van den hole, supra note 22, at 97.
211 See, e.g., SINGH, supra note 39, at 16.
212 Martinez, supra note 16, at 166, 191.
204
205
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light of the rule permitting those subject to attack to take
defensive measures, this allocation of risk might be entirely
appropriate.213
5. Object and Purpose of the Treaty
Under the interpretive approach of the Vienna Convention, a
treaty should be considered “in the light of its object of
purpose.”214 The purpose to be examined is not merely the
purpose of the individual rule under consideration, but that of
the treaty as a whole.215 Here, both sides of the debate over the
permissibility of anticipatory self-defense can marshal
compelling arguments. Those favoring a restrictive approach are
aided by the Charter’s manifest focus on keeping interstate
violence to a minimum.216 An interpretation of the right of selfdefense that unnecessarily increases the likelihood that force will
be used, such as the interpretation articulated by the permissive
Their
school, is inconsistent with this overriding goal.217
interpretation allows the self-defense exception to override the
prohibition on using force.218 The permissive interpretation gives
rise to circumstances in which creative argument might justify
any use of force by connecting its use to speculation about some
future threat that might reasonably—whether rightly or
wrongly—be perceived as imminent.219 In an era where deadly
weapons are capable of widespread and serious harm, the
dangers of resorting to force are compounded.220
Similarly, the Charter is designed to ensure the operation of
mechanisms guided toward the peaceful settlement of
international disputes.221 Achievement of this purpose may be
thwarted if the right of self-defense is construed too broadly. If
states can anticipate potential attacks and respond with force
before they occur, the underlying disputes that engendered
hostility between the states may give rise to interstate violence
before mechanisms that promote peaceful settlements of

Sofaer, supra note 95, at 97-98.
U.N. Conference, supra note 76, at art. 31, para. 1.
U.N. Conference, supra note 76, at art. 31, para. 1 (stating that “[a] treaty shall be
interpreted . . . in the light of its object and purpose”) (emphasis added).
216 See Charney, supra note 69, at 836 (calling this focus “the primary goal of the
United Nations Charter”).
217 See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 44, at 259 (noting situations in which the use of
anticipatory self-defense may be open to objections).
218 See O’CONNELL, supra note 208, at 5, 16.
219 O’CONNELL, supra note 208, at 16; see also Jorge Alberto Ramirez, Iraq War:
Anticipatory Self-Defense or Unlawful Unilateralism? 34 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 1, 23-24 (2003)
(discussing the dangers of broadening the use of anticipatory self-defense).
220 See Schachter, The Right of States, supra note 129, at 1634.
221 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 3; Simma, supra note 29, at 105-07.
213
214
215
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international disputes have a chance to work.222 The time
available for peaceful dispute resolution to function is reduced,
possibly by a significant amount, depending upon the accuracy of
the estimation as to the imminence of the attack by the state
exercising its right of self-defense.
Additionally, the Charter’s language was meant to be
functional in nature and capable of practical application.223 The
restrictionist school of thought believes that Article 51 imposes
such a rule in the context of self-defense: the use of force is
justified if an armed attack occurs, and is not if an armed attack
has yet to occur.224 Those advancing a permissive interpretation
of the right of self-defense favor a considerably less certain
analysis based only upon the customary standard rather than the
objectively determinable criteria of the occurrence of an armed
attack.225 The rule as permissively interpreted is more difficult
to apply, and the risk of error is increased.226 The benefits of a
clear rule are lost. Requiring an armed attack before using force
in self-defense clearly informs states of the activity they must
avoid in order to prevent force being used against them. The
permissive approach also leaves states less certain as to what
preventive measures they can take to avoid the permissible use
of force against them.
Those favoring the permissive approach can agree that the
Charter was meant to produce a soundly-functioning
international system, but need not accept the restrictive
approach’s viewpoint of what such a system entails. Under this
view, the Charter established a framework within which
international peace and security can be maintained with the
states themselves as primary beneficiaries. States, and their
sovereignty and integrity, were to be preserved by the U.N.
rather than subsumed into a world government.227 Diminution of
the scope of the “inherent” right of self-defense would amount to
an unwarranted intrusion into a fundamental aspect of

222 See CASSESE, supra note 46, at 217 (noting scope of obligation to peacefully settle
disputes).
223 See FRANCK, supra note 106, at 6-7.
224 See O’CONNELL, supra note 208, at 19 (“An attack must be underway or must have
already occurred in order to trigger the right of unilateral self-defense.”).
225 Eckert & Mofidi, supra note 15, at 149; see also CASSESE, supra note 46, at 309
(discussing historical examples of customary standards).
226 CASSESE, supra note 46, at 309; BROWNLIE, supra note 44, at 259; O’CONNELL,
supra note 208, at 19.
227 See U.N. Charter art. 2 (distinguishing between “[t]he Organization and its
Members,” acknowledging by implication that its Members are “sovereign,” and clarifying
that “[n]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state”).
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sovereignty.228
Self-defense is too fundamental to this
sovereignty to have artificial time limits placed upon it by the
Charter or customary law.
In addition, the Council has been only modestly successful in
performing its primary function of achieving sustained peace.229
The Charter was intended to be a holistic scheme for ensuring
international peace, safeguarding states from aggression and
preserving the right of self-defense as a supplement to the
collective mechanism embodied in the Council.230 The Council’s
limited success thus far suggests that the purpose of maintaining
international peace and security may not be fulfilled unless force
in self-defense may be exercised in more than the narrowest of
circumstances.231
Furthermore, as a practical matter, the permissive school
can argue that the Charter should not be interpreted as a suicide
pact that illegalizes defensive actions necessary for a state to
preserve itself.232 Since the Charter was signed in June 1945, the
weapons available to states have become even more destructive.
Such weapons may enable an attacker to strike a decisive blow
against its victim in one stroke. By the time an attack is
underway, it may simply be too late to take measures in selfdefense.233 If the law guarantees that the attacker may strike
first, it has effectively rewarded that state’s violence with
military advantage.234 The purpose of the Charter was certainly
not to encourage violence or to deprive states of the ability to
take reasonable steps to defend themselves. The restrictive view
impedes resort to the right of self-defense, potentially making
resort to violence acceptable and advantageous to states in a
position to take advantage of others that scrupulously follow the
law.235

U.N. Charter art. 51.
See, e.g., Patrick McLain, Settling the Score with Saddam: Resolution 1441 and
Parallel Justifications for the Use of Force against Iraq, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L. L. 233,
258 (2003); see also Gray, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 25, at 590 (indicating that
Chapter VII enforcement by the Security Council did not proceed as originally planned).
230 See FRANCK, supra note 106, at 3.
231 See McLain, supra note 229, at 258-59 (suggesting this notion, but ultimately
rejecting the argument that current law allows for unilateral action based on the Security
Council’s ineffectiveness).
232 See Martinez, supra note 16, at 162-63.
233 See Martinez, supra note 16, at 162-63.
234 See BROWNLIE, supra note 44, at 276 (suggesting but disagreeing with this
argument).
235 See FRANCK, supra note 106, at 178 (noting that “[l]aw . . . does not thrive . . .
when it grossly offends most persons’ common moral sense of what is right”).
228
229
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III. EVALUATION OF THE ASSERTED RIGHT TO USE PREEMPTIVE
FORCE IN SELF-DEFENSE
The divide between the interpretive approaches to the right
of self-defense runs deep, and the state of the law with respect to
the availability of anticipatory self-defense is likely to remain
unclear. However, fairly widespread agreement exists as to the
substance of the customary rules limiting the exercise of selfdefense.236 Even those who assert the validity of anticipatory
self-defense generally agree that customary rules limit its
exercise.237 Regardless of one’s position on the interpretation of
Article 51, using force in self-defense in contravention of this
minimal customary standard will assuredly violate international
law.
The preemptive use of force in self-defense, which was
enunciated as the U.S. strategy in the NSS and was suggested as
a possible justification for the Iraq war, must be evaluated in
light of these standards. Initially, the NSS’s suggestion that
agreement on the permissibility of anticipatory self-defense has
existed “[f]or centuries” must be a reference to the period before
recourse to force was prohibited as a general matter by the
Charter, subject to a carefully-worded recognition of the right to
self-defense.238 Since the Charter’s adoption, two schools of
thought on anticipatory self-defense have existed. The restrictive
position, far from viewing such action as capable of being taken
“lawfully” or with “legitimacy,” categorically bars using force in
The NSS’s
self-defense before an armed attack occurs.239
preemptive strategy does not comport with this position because
the U.S. plans to use defensive force long before potential
attackers are prepared to act.240
Moreover, even if the NSS is considered in light of the
permissive approach to the right of self-defense, the preemptive
strategy does not pass muster.
First, even a permissive
interpretation of Article 51 cannot completely do away with the
236 GRAY, USE OF FORCE, supra note 15, at 105 (“As part of the basic core of selfdefence all states agree that self-defence must be necessary and proportionate.”).
237 See, e.g., Louis Rene Beres, Preserving the Third Temple: Israel’s Right of
Anticipatory Self-Defense Under International Law, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 111, 14748 (1993); see also SINGH, supra note 39, at 16 (discussing limits on the use of anticipatory
self-defense).
238 See NSS, supra note 2, at 15 (explaining the evolving concept of “imminent threat”
since the Cold War); Simma, supra note 29, at 114-15 (discussing that before the
twentieth century, the use of force was not prohibited under international law);
BROWNLIE, supra note 44, at 40-41 (presumably, the NSS refers to these old
justifications).
239 See, e.g., American Soc’y of Int’l Law, Self-Defense in an age of Terrorism, supra
note 101, at 147-48.
240 See NSS, supra note 2, at 15.
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requirement of an armed attack.241
To the extent that
preemptive self-defense is asserted to justify the use of force
against speculative threats that bear no relation to any armed
attack, the Charter will bar the claim.242 Second, customary
rules are likely to foreclose the permissibility of preemptive selfdefense if circumstances arise in which Article 51 does not.
Unjustifiable preemptive self-defense differs from potentially
permissible anticipatory self-defense in that it allows states to
unleash force against one another with much greater ease.243
Anticipatory self-defense, as advocated by most adherents to the
permissive interpretation of self-defense, is impermissible if a
state cannot demonstrate that a threat actually exists and is
imminent.244 In contrast, preemptive self-defense, such as that
called for by the NSS, permits the use of force by states that
merely feel threatened, without requiring a showing of
objectively verifiable indications that the asserted threat
warrants the use of force in reply.245 Proportionality becomes
virtually impossible to measure as to preemptive force, because
no attack has occurred, is occurring, or is planned as to which the
use of force must be proportionate.246 A legal regime that would
permit the preemptive use of force in self-defense would be far
too careless in its handling of the use of interstate force, a
fearsome villain who the parties to the Charter knew from
personal experience247 had to be kept in shackles of law.248
Second, those advocating a permissive approach agree with
their restrictive-minded counterparts that the use of force in selfdefense must be restrained by the customary law concepts of
241 See U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 4 (suggesting that although member states must
refrain from threatening or using force where inconsistent with the Charter, they may
threaten or use force when it is not inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations).
242 See, e.g., O’CONNELL, supra note 208, at 6 (“[W]here a state is threatened by force
not amounting to an armed attack, it must resort to measures less than armed selfdefense . . . .”).
243 See CASSESE, supra note 46, at 310 (suggesting that “risks of abuse” might arise in
a legal regime that permitted pre-emptive strikes) (emphasis omitted).
244 E.g., SINGH, supra note 39, at 16; Simma, supra note 29, at 803 (noting that many
advocates of anticipatory self-defense view it as incorporating a requirement of
imminence).
245 O’CONNELL, supra note 208, at 21 (identifying concerns with the subjective nature
of the determination of when a sufficient threat has arisen, and characterizing the U.S.
justification for preemptive war as based on “speculative concerns about [a] state’s
possible future actions”); CASSESE, supra note 46, at 310 (“[P]re-emptive strikes . . . may
be[] based on subjective and arbitrary appraisals by individual States.”).
246 O’CONNELL, supra note 208, at 19.
247 See U.N. Charter pmbl. (prominently evincing the widely shared desire “to save
succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought
untold sorrow to mankind”).
248 See U.N. Charter art. 2, paras. 3-4; see also SHAW, supra note 50, at 681
(remarking that “the law must seek to provide mechanisms to restrain and punish the
resort to violence”).
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necessity and proportionality.249 However, one cannot assess the
facts and circumstances that give rise to the necessity of the use
of force, and confine its proportions, before the attack actually
occurs.250 For adherents of the restrictive view, this is one reason
why an armed attack must actually have occurred before force is
used in self-defense. For adherents of the permissive view, the
requirement that the armed attack be imminent assuages
concerns about the availability of facts sufficient to draw
conclusions about whether a given use of force is justified.
The NSS, however, does not require a showing of an
imminent threat before authorizing preemptive uses of force.
The administration explains that, “as a matter of common sense
and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats
before they are fully formed.”251 Indeed, the U.S. strategy
expressly seeks to “adapt the concept of imminent threat,”
apparently allowing for force to be used “preemptively,” “even if
uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s
attack,” and even before “dangers gather.”252 U.S. action against
Iraq demonstrates that the NSS’s notion of imminence does not
require an immediate or tremendous threat by a potential
attacker.253 Indeed, if the Iraq situation is any guide, a threat
may be sufficient to trigger NSS authorization to use force in
purported self-defense if it is little more than plausible or even a
hypothetical threat.
If the rules regulating the use of force are relaxed to reflect
U.S. policy, conflicts may arise that could be prevented if the
rules governing self-defense continue to require a truly imminent
threat.254 The U.S. position may also produce interstate violence
by creating an increased incidence of improper uses of force by
states that feel less reluctant to use force purportedly in selfdefense than in the past.255 Moreover, a standard that relies on a
considerably less imminent threat is more likely to give rise to
mistakes by the defenders as to whether they faced a threat at

249 See Van den hole, supra note 22, at 97 (one of many articles asserting the
permissibility of anticipatory self-defense while agreeing that the customary rules apply
to its exercise); see also GRAY, USE OF FORCE, supra note 15, at 105 (discussing the
agreement of states as to the necessity and proportionality requirements of self-defense).
250 See BROWNLIE, supra note 44, at 259.
251 NSS, supra note 2, at Introduction.
252 NSS, supra note 2, at 15.
253 See Eckert & Mofidi, supra note 15, at 126 (noting the wide discrepancies between
the U.S. assertions of the existence of a threat stemming from weapons of mass
destruction that were used to justify the action against Iraq, and Iraq’s apparent lack of
such weapons).
254 Ramirez, supra note 219, at 23-24; BROWNLIE, supra note 44, at 259.
255 BROWNLIE, supra note 44, at 259.
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all.256 As the evidentiary problems with the case for self-defense
in Iraq demonstrate, the U.S. government will experience
mistakes with its current understanding of the self-defense
rule.257 The abandonment of the requirement of an imminent
threat leaves no principled means by which the law can
distinguish force used in self-defense from aggression.258 The
Bush administration’s understanding of the constraints of
customary law on self-defense is at variance with that law in its
present form.
Thus, the U.S. position in the NSS may be best described as
an argument for a change in the law. Some writers have argued,
on the assumption that the use of force in self-defense can be
permitted before an armed attack occurs, that the war in Iraq is
state practice that provides evidence of a change in the
customary law loosening the constraints of necessity and
proportionality.259 Some scholars have gone further, arguing that
the prohibition on the use of force has come to lack vitality, and
that the use of force for purposes such as preemptive self-defense
is no longer forbidden.260 These arguments are misplaced. The
creation of a new customary rule traditionally requires “an
established, widespread, and consistent practice”261 combined
with “evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory
by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.”262 The practice of
justifying the use of force on grounds of preemptive or
anticipatory self-defense is not consistent or widespread.263
Furthermore, the psychological element of opinio juris is not
present: the U.S. has conceded that “[it] must adapt the concept
of imminent threat” as currently understood,264 and many other
states apparently view the U.S. justification of self-defense for
the preemptive use of force in Iraq as inappropriate.265 This
refusal to treat divergent state practice as an emerging
customary rule suggests the continued vitality of existing
256 The U.S. requires less information about the purported attacker’s disposition to
justify the use of force as compared to the current permissive view of anticipatory selfdefense. See NSS, supra note 2, at Introduction, 15.
257 Eckert & Mofidi, supra note 15, at 127-28.
258 See, e.g., American Soc’y of Int’l Law, supra note 101, at 151-52.
259 See, e.g., Cohan, supra note 95, at 292, 356.
260 Martinez, supra note 16, at 164. Contra Michael Byers, Terrorism, the Use of
Force and International Law after 11 September, 51 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 401, 410-11
(2002).
261 Thirlway, supra note 24, at 125.
262 Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3, 90 (July 25).
263 GRAY, USE OF FORCE, supra note 15, at 112.
264 NSS, supra note 2, at 15.
265 David P. Fidler, International Law and Weapons of Mass Destruction: End of the
Arms Control?, 14 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 39, 72-73 (2004); Eckert & Mofidi, supra note
15, at 127.
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rules.266 Finally, from a policy standpoint, it cannot be denied
that the elimination or substantial weakening of the rules
restricting the use of force would have a deleterious effect on
international order, potentially unleashing anarchy as states
other than the U.S. come to view the use of force as a permissible
means of resolving their disputes.267
Perhaps to avoid the negative impact of other states’
assertions of a right to use preemptive force, the NSS appears to
have taken an extreme approach. The NSS can be read to argue
that different rules should apply to constrain the use of force by
the U.S., and that these rules should be relatively permissive.268
This approach, however, is difficult to square with the U.N.’s
fundamental “principle of the sovereign equality of all its
Members.”269 While states are not equal in other respects, each
should be treated as a formal equal of the others for purposes of
Exceptional
applying the rules of international law.270
approaches subvert this important principle.
They place
international law in the unsatisfying position of serving as an
ongoing and evolving apologia for the actions of powerful
states.271 They are also inconsistent with basic notions of
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J 14, 98 (June 27).
See Martinez, supra note 16, at 164-65 (discussing these concerns in the context of
the debate over the permissibility of anticipatory self-defense); see also Eckert & Mofidi,
supra note 15, at 150 (warning of the danger of leaving states with “a loose,
unsubstantiated notion of ‘preemptive self-defense’”); O’CONNELL, supra note 208, at 19
(discussing possible effects of America’s precedent).
268 See NSS, supra note 2, at 15 (the NSS briefly refers to international law, but then
asserts that “[w]e must adapt” it. The document then indicates that “[t]he United States
has long maintained the option of preemptive actions.” Implicit in these remarks is the
suggestion that the U.S. can unilaterally change international law, and that it possesses
rights under that law that may differ from those of other states); see also Michael Byers &
Simon Chesterman, Changing the Rules About Rules? Unilateral Humanitarian
Intervention and the Future of International Law, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION:
ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 177, 195 (J. L. Holzgrefe & Robert O. Keohane
eds., 2003) (suggesting that the creation of exceptional rights characterizes the current
administration’s approach to international relations generally); Detlev F. Vagts,
Hegemonic International Law, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 843, 843-48 (2001) (suggesting the
applicability of special international rules to hegemons).
269 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1 (“The Organization is based on the principle of the
sovereign equality of all its Members.”).
270 U.N. Charter, art. 2, para 1; see CASSESE, supra note 46, at 88, 90; Simma, supra
note 29, at 85; see also Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 141 (explaining that
“[a]ll states . . . have equal rights and duties and are equal members of the international
community”).
271 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Liberal International Relations Theory and
International Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 717, 724 (1995) (summarizing
the argument that international law can be aimed either at meaningfully constraining
state behavior or as merely justifying it at every turn); see also THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF
THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 402 (Rex Warner trans., Penguin Books 1972) (1954) (“[W]hen
these matters are discussed by practical people, the standard of justice depends on the
equality of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do
and the weak accept what they have to accept.”).
266
267
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fairness in an international system that has long been governed
by rules that are the product of states’ mutual consent.272
IV. CONCLUSION
The strategy of preemptive self-defense articulated by the
U.S. in the NSS, and apparently applied against Iraq, is at odds
with current norms governing the use of force in self-defense. In
order for the preemptive use of force to be lawful
notwithstanding the Charter’s prohibition of the use of force, U.S.
strategy would have to comport with the Charter and customary
law relevant to the right of self-defense. Application of either of
the prevailing interpretations of the right of self-defense leads to
the conclusion that the U.S. strategy does not comply with
international law. The U.S. strategy calls for resorting to force at
an earlier stage than the Charter and customary law permit.
Consequently, unless and until changes to the law are made that
render the U.S. position regarding preemptive force compatible
with the law governing self-defense, the U.S.’s “threat or use of
force” in the circumstances identified in its strategy will remain
inconsistent with international law.273

272 See
Dinah Shelton, International Law and ‘Relative Normativity,’ in
INTERNATIONAL LAW 145, 151 (Malcolm Evans ed., Oxford University Press 2003);
CASSESE, supra note 46, at 123; see also Matthew 7:12 (New American Bible) (“Do to
others whatever you would have them do to you.”).
273 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.

